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QUANTITATIVE METHODS AND SUPREME COURT CASES
By PmLIP SLAYTON*
It is generally thought necessary, in order to grasp the "meaning" of a
judicial decision, to analyse virtually every word uttered by a judge. Scholars
eagerly seek in judgments, legal, logical, and even literary inconsistencies.
Academic lawyers argue over what in a given case is the ratio decidendi and
what is merely obiter. Barristers and the bench, committed to stare decisis,
pore over the texts of decisions, looking for a solution to a worrying case.
A variety of forces opposed to this tradition, building in strength over
a number of years, have lately coalesced. The result is a radical departure
by some in the way of analysing judicial decisions. In Canada this has been
most apparent in scholarly writing on the Supreme Court of Canada. The
old style academic article,' developing general statements of legal principles
by extensive analysis of individual decisions, now competes with the new
methodology of linear cumulative scaling, or scalogram analysis. 2
Scalogram analysis is one research method in a complex scheme of
research methods, research theory, and substantive theory. Glendon Schu-
bert has identified four levels of methodological complexity: statistical des-
cription of empirical data collected, linear cumulative scaling, multi-variate
*Assistant Professor of Law, McGill University. I should like particularly to express
my gratitude to Professor Sydney Peck, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
for gently correcting many of my misconceptions of quantitative methods. My thanks
also to Professor Glendon Schubert, of the Department of Political Science, University
of Hawaii, who pointed out serious inadequacies in my study of behaviouralism.
I Such as O'Halloran, Criminal Law and the Supreme Court 1923-1947 (1948), 26
Can. Bar Rev. 158; Laskin, The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for
Canadians (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 1038; Read, The Judicial Process in Common
Law Canada (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 265; Azard, Cour sllpreme du Canada et l'ap-
plication du droit civil de la province de Qudbec (1965), 43 Can. Bar Rev. 553; Slay-
ton, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Common Law of Contract (1971), 17
McGill LJ. 476; and Weiler, Groping Towards a Canadian Tort Law: The Role of the
Supreme Court of Canada (1971), 21 U. of Toronto LJ. 267. Weiler's article is
probably not a good example of traditional analysis, forming part of a series of articles
with precise and in some respects novel theoretical underpinnings.
2 See, for example, Peck, The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1966: A Search for
Policy through Scalogram Analysis (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 666; Peck, A Behavioural
Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram Analysis (1967), 5 O.H.LJ. 6; Peck,
A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1967 in Schubert and
Danelski (eds.), Comparative Judicial Behaviour (New York: Oxford University Press,
1969) 293; and Fouts, Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-1960 in
Comparative Judicial Behaviour 257. Russell, in The Supreme Court of Canada as a
Bilingual and Bicultural Institution (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1969), employs
rather crude quantitative techniques. Says Russell himself at p. 114: "... we hasten to
acknowledge the relatively primitive quality of the quantifying techniques we have
employed. With the exception of the bloc-voting analysis derived from the work of
Glendon Schubert, the other schemes were developed very quickly and in a completely
ad hoc manner."
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analysis, and causal analysis. He has described four levels of "research
theory" which he believes correspond closely to the levels of research meth-
ods: sociological theory, cumulative scaling concerned with attitudinal theory
as a branch of social psychology, metric factor or smallest space analysis
investigating judicial ideology as a branch of social psychology, and a special
kind of mathematical statistics which facilitates causal analysis. Finally,
Schubert lists five levels of what he calls substantive theory -sociologicaljurisprudence, legal sociology (investigating the cultural bases for adjudi-
cative systems), political sociology (having as its objective the empirical
description of adjudicative systems as an aspect of political behaviour), the
social psychology of elite ideology, and general decision-making theory.8
The origins of the scaling method4 are apparently to be found in
psychophysics, a science developed in the nineteenth century by Gustav
Fechner.5 Gulliksen describes psychophysics as including "the measure-
ment of sensory attributes and the quantification of perception, in order to
correlate these psychological scales with physical measurements of the
stimuli."" In 1927, a paper by Louis Thurstone 7 "developed the law of
comparative judgment for data collected by Fechner's method of paired
comparisons and showed that it was possible to obtain internally consistent
measurements for various psychological attributes such as, for example, the
intensity of feeling toward various 'nationalities,' the judgment of the various
merits of compositions, or preferences for various foods or gifts."8 The 1927
Thurstone paper, according to Gulliksen, was the inspiration for a tremendous
body of work on procedures for constructing scales for the measurement of
psychological attributes.
Scalogram analysis is only one of many measurement procedures exist-
ing at the same level of methodological complexity. Torgerson divides these
procedures into three kinds: the subject-centered approach, in which variation
in the reaction (responses) of the subjects to the stimuli is attributed to
individual differences in the subjects; the judgment approach, in which varia-
tions in the reactions of subjects to the stimuli is attributed to differences in
the stimuli; and the response approach, in which variability of reactions to
stimuli is ascribed to both variation in the subjects and in the stimuli.9 Scalo-
gram analysis exemplifies the response approach, in which "the task set for
the subject is to respond to a stimulus on the basis of the position of the
aFor this analysis, see Schubert, From Area Study to Mathematical Theory, in
Comparative Judicial Behaviour, supra note 2 at 13-15.
4 We are now discussing, to use Schubert's system, the linear cumulative scaling
level of methodological complexity, and the cumulative scaling level of research theory(concerned with attitudinal theory as a branch of social psychology).
5 See Gulliksen, Foreword, in Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling (New
York: Wiley, 1958) at v.
0 Id.
7 Thurstone, A Law of Comparative Judgment (1927), 34 Psychol. Rev. 273.8 Gulliksen, supra note 5 at v.
9 Torgerson, supra note 5 at 46. Torgerson has little interest in the subject-centered
approach; most applications of this approach he considers simply "measurement by
definition."
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stimulus in relation to the subject's own position with respect to the attri-
bute."' 01 In the judgment approach, "the task set for the subject is to evaluate
the stimuli with respect to some designated attribute."" Torgerson distin-
tinguishes between the two approaches in this way:
... consider two attitude statements taken from Thurstone and Chave's mono-
graph (1929, p. 61).
1. I find the services of the church both restful and inspiring.
2. I think the church is a parasite on society.
In the judgment approach, the task set for the subject might be to judge
which statement is more favourable to the church. A subject would be expected
to pick statement 1 regardless of his own attitude toward the church. In the
response approach, the task set for the subject might be to pick the statement
with which he is in closest agreement. In this case, both his own attitude and the
attitude reflected by the stimuli act to determine his response.12
Within the category of response methods, Torgerson draws some crucial
distinctions. Deterministic models state an ideal case which is not expected to
correspond exactly with reality; accordingly, there is no provision for error.
The result is that "all the variations in the responses of subjects to stimuli
are accounted for in the model by the positions of the subjects and the posi-
tions of the stimuli."' Probabilistic models, by contrast, incorporate the
idea of error and can account for unsystematic variation. A further classifi-
cation examines the nature of the subject's task. He may be required to
respond categorically (simply agreeing or disagreeing), or comparatively
(ordering stimuli according to preference.) Scalogram analysis, to adopt these
additional distinctions, is deterministic and requires categorical responses.'
4
Glendon Schubert was one of the first seriously to experiment with the
applicability of cumulative scaling techniques to judicial decisions. Writing in
1959, Schubert observed that scaling cases differed from scaling in social-
psychological research in at least two important respects. First of all, in
social-psychological research, the size of the set of items constituting what is
known as "the universe of content" is generally unknown; it is difficult or
impossible to ask all possible questions relating to the topic, and equally
difficult or impossible to prepare what is without question a fair sample of
all possible questions. By contrast, argued Schubert, the student of judicial
cases can easily define his universe of content, (e.g., all Supreme Court deci-
sions dealing with mens rea, or res ipsa loquitur), and the universe of con-
tent so defined is of known size and can be exhausted. This conceptual dif-
ference produces a procedural difference; "in attitude research, one often
eliminates items on the ground that 'they do not scale'; we [legal scholars]
10 Id. at 48.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 48-9. The Thurstone and Chave monograph referred to is The Measure-
ment of Attitude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).
13 Id. at 59.
14 Id. at 60.
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have no occasion or justification for excluding cases on these grounds."' 5
Writes Schubert:
If, after analysis, the researcher [social psychologist] finds some item to
evoke an unusual number of responses which do not fit the hypothesized scale
pattern, he can draw the following alternative inferences: either he can argue
that the offending item should never have been included since it elicits responses
along some dimension other than the universe to be scaled; or else he may
argue that the item clearly belongs in the hypothesized universe and that, there-
fore, given the large number of deviant responses, the theoretical continuum has
no counterpart in the empirical world - the attitude is "not scalable." ...
In the scale analysis of judicial cases, the items are not "constructed," and
we cannot argue therefore that their connotations are other than those "intend-
ed." Rather, cases are selected by classifying the known collection of all cases
decided.... For this reason, our scales contain two types of items that would
ordinarily not be found in scales constructed by social -psychologists: items which
"do not scale," and items which "duplicate" one another.16
The second important respect in which social-psychological scaling
differs from scaling cases, notes Schubert, is in the definition of "respon-
dent." In the field of social psychology, "the entire 'instrument' is given to
all respondents. Consequently, the respondents answering each item are
identical and hence equal in number. Conversely, all respondents react to all
items in the same set.' 7 But in scaling judicial decisions, a large non-re-
sponse factor must be taken into account, since (1) there may be vacancies
on the court being examined, (2) a judge may decline to participate in a
given case, (3) a judge who participates in a case may decline to vote on
the merits, and (4) judges vote only in cases considered during their incum-
bency, but universes of content extend well beyond any given incumbency.'
Schubert's 1959 book, in addition to indicating in general terms the
way in which a technique developed in the field of social psychology could
be applied to the analysis of judicial decisions, described precisely how scalo-
grams of judicial cases could be constructed,' 9 and made a number of experi-
mental applications of scalogram analysis to the Supreme Court of the United
States.20 Schubert's pioneering work continued in 1963 with the publication
of Judicial Decision-Making,2' essays edited by Schubert, and with the 1965
1 5 Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Decisions (Glencoe: The Free Press,
1959) 269-70.
10 Id. at 276.
17 Id. at 277.
18 Id. at 278.
19 Id. at 280-290.
20 Id. at 290-376. These pages include a discussion of the Kort procedure for pre-
dicting decisions mathematically. See Fred Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions
Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the 'Right to Counsel' Cases, (1957), 51
Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1.
21 (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1963). This volume includes studies by Sidney
Ulmer, Stuart Nagel, Harold Spaeth, Joseph Tannenhaus, Fred Kort, and Ulf Torger-
son. Another volume of case-studies edited by Schubert (with David Danelski) is
Comparative Judicial Behaviour (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
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study The Judicial Mind.22 In The Judicial Mind, Schubert described the scal-
ing methodology in this way:
... the cases which the Court has docketed for decision-making on the merits
of the issues presented are conceptualized as being equivalent to the items of a
questionnaire. Each case asks the justices to respond to the question: is your
attitude toward value X sufficiently favourable that you believe that a claim of
degree Y should be upheld? ... X defines the content of the scale variable which
is perceived by the respondents to be the relevant criterion for deciding the case;
Y is the perceived verbal statement which specifies the location of the stimulus-
point on the scale ...
If a judicial respondent accepts the defined valuation, he is scored as having
voted affirmatively; if he rejects it, he is scored as having voted negatively. The
scale matrix consists of scores for the votes of the respondents, with each column
consisting of the set of votes of a single justice for all decisions in which he
participated, and each row consisting of that set of votes for all justices who
participated in a particular decision... In constructing the scale, the objective
is the usual one of maximizing the internal consistency of the voting patterns
for the respondents .. 23
Canadian writers have not embraced cumulative methods with the fer-
vour of some of their American counterparts. 24 Professor Sydney Peck's
claims for scalogram analysis, for example, have been consistently modest.
To quote a passage I have already quoted elsewhere:
:- a scalogram should be taken, prima jacie, only as describing the effect ofjustices' votes on a particular type of claim or value raised by a group of cases.
Regarded alone, the scalogram does not indicate directly the justices' attitudes to
the value; nor does it establish that the justices decide cases on the basis of their
attitudes, although it may suggest the possibility that they do. Such a possibility
must be assessed in the light of the reasons for judgment in the scaled cases,
the unanimous decisions which do not appear on the scale, and the whole range
of legal and sociological insights which are revealed by a traditional and realist
analysis of the case.2 5
As a criticism of the kind of work -done by Peck, I have noted elsewhere
that preparation of a scalogram requires characterization of the issue raised
22 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965). In 1965 Schubert also pub-
lished Judicial Policy-Making (Glenview: Scott, Foresman, 1965), a study of the judi-
ciary based on what is known as "systems theory" or "structional-functional analysis."
23. Schubert, The Judicial Mind, supra note 22 at 75-77. This work is replete with
examples of the application of the scaling methodology. For a detailed account of the
theory of scalogram analysis, see Torgerson, supra note 5 at 307-317, and Coombs, A
Theory of Data (New York: Wiley, 1964) 227-236. For a simple description of cumu-
lative scaling, see Tannenhaus, The Cumulative Scaling of Judicial Decisions (1966),
79 Harv. L Rev. 1586, quoted and discussed by Slayton, A Critical Comment on Scale-
gram Analysis of Supreme Court of Canada Cases (1971), 21 U. of Toronto LJ. at
396-7.
24 Extravagant claims for the method have been rejected by some American writers.
Peck, supra note 2, 5 O.H.LJ., footnotes 81, 82a and 88, cites the following writings
critical of judicial behaviouralists: Becker, Inquiry into a School of Thought in the
Judicial Behaviour Movement (1963), Midw. J. Pol. Sci. 254; Mendelson, The Neo-
Behavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: A Critique (1963), 57 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 593; Mendelson, The Untroubled World of Jurimetrics (1964), 22 J. Pol. 914.
For a different evaluation, see Baade, Foreword (1963), 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 1.
25 Peck, supra note 2, 45 Can. Bar Rev. at 681, quoted by Slayton, supra note 23
at 398. Similar passages appear in Peck, supra note 2, 5 O.H.LJ. at 21, and Peck,
supra note 2, Comparative Judicial Behaviour at 294.
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by cases that may be of interest (so that an appropriate universe of content
can be constituted), and that it is the researcher who makes the required
characterization. I wrote:
... [the researcher] is willing to ignore the spectrum of reasons why a judge
might decide the case ... and assume that the judge's vote is an answer to his,
the researcher's, postulated question. It appears that although scalogram analysis
proceeds on the assumption that judges decide cases on the basis of their atti-
tudes towards policy issues, the technique requires that the analysts, by postu-
lating questions which characterize cases, impose their, the analysts', attitudes on
the judiciary.26
Professor Peck has pointed out 27 that if one regards the scalogram as simply
being a descriptive device which shows the effects of judges' voting patterns
on particular types of issues, then this criticism of mine is at the very least
irrelevant, since no assumptions about judges' attitudes have been made. The
researcher has, of course, exercised judgment in deciding what cases are rele-
vant to what issues, and may well have decided incorrectly. Such a mistake
would mean that the scalogram was misleading in showing how the Court
has affected a given issue, but it would not mean that judges' attitudes had
been incorrectly characterized.
Professor Paul Weiler has recently been publishing a series of studies
of the Supreme Court of Canada which employs, to some extent, the scale-
gram method28 Weiler's attitude towards the method is ambivalent. On the
one hand, he apparently feels that behavioural analysis can indicate the role
of judicial attitudes in decision-making. He writes that "behavioural analysis
of the flow of decisions is likely to isolate ... attitudes and indicate their
influence on judicial choices made ' 29 and says of the significance of the
cumulative scale that "if statistical criteria excluding chance are met, it be-
comes legitimate (though perhaps not scientifically necessary) to infer that
the judges perceived these cases along this particular dimension and voted in
accordance with their attitude to it."30
On the other hand, Weiler recognizes many of the defects of cumula-
tive scaling, and is cautious in use of the method. He notes that "judges may
2 6 Slayton, supra note 23 at 397. Peck alludes to this point in 45 Can. Bar Rev.
at 674.
27In private correspondence with the author, Professor Peck suggests, I think
correctly, that in my earlier article I failed to differentiate clearly between scalogram
analysis as a technique for measuring attitudes and scalogram analysis as a descriptive
device only. Professor Peck writes: "I think that our approach is different in that you
have not drawn as sharp a distinction as I have between the two uses of scalogram
analysis. I think that the distinction is important as some points in your critique are
relevant to the first use of scalogram analysis but not to the second..."28 Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Doctrines of Mens Rea (1971),
49 Can. Bar Rev. 280; Weiler, Groping Towards a Canadian Tort Law: The Role of
the Supreme Court of Canada (1971), 21 U of Toronto LJ. 267; Weiler, The 'Slippery
Slope' of Judicial Intervention: The Supreme Court and Canadian Labour Relations
1950-1970 (1971), 9 O.H.LJ. 1. Weiler laid the foundation for his study of the Supreme
Court in Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 406, and
in Legal Values and Judicial Decision-Making (1970), 48 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
20 Id., 49 Can. Bar Rev. at 291.
30 Id. at 292.
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not have perceived their votes as expressing, the values which the behaviou-
ralist imputes to their decision."31 More generally, Weiler writes that "I as-
sume that courts are more than judicial voters, and that the significant aspects
of judicial behaviour are not confined to their votes,' 3 2 and that "judicial
development of rules is the product of reasoned opinions and this process of
reasoning must be assumed to have some influence on the rules that result."33
It is interesting to note that in Weiler's article on mens rea, e only fourteen of
eighty-three pages are devoted to scaling. In his study of the development of
Canadian tort law by the Supreme Court,35 Weiler relied entirely on what
might be termed "traditional substantive analysis," although he indicated in
a note 6 that he has completed behavioural analyses of the Court's "decision-
making and opinion-writing pattern" in the tort field which will be published
later. Weiler's continued caution in the use of the method is evident from this
passage in his tort article:
.*. it would be a great surprise if such behavioural techniques as scaling judicial
decisions did not disclose that the personal attitudes of the judges play a signi-
ficant role in determining the pattern of decisions which result. This corrective
to the analytic and 'black letter' approach to reading judicial opinions should not
be pressed to the opposite extreme. The requirement that opinions be written
to justify a vote, that a majority must be constructed from groups whose policy
and legal attitudes vary, and the customary expectations attendant on judicial
reasoning all impose substantial limitations on the scope for advancement of
preferred values.37
The way in which Weler uses behavioural techniques can perhaps best be
seen in his study of the Court and Canadian labour relations.38 There, three
tables, depicting the activity of the Court in the labour relations field, the
voting and decisional pattern in cases involving direct conflict between union
and employer, and the attitude of the Court towards Labour Board decisions,
establish a framework for an extensive traditional discussion of the relevant
cases. Weiler apparently sees behavioural methods as a useful device indicat-
ing fruitful lines for traditional inquiry, and certainly does not see such
methods supplanting the old ways. Unlike Peck, however, Weiler does be-
lieve that behavioural methods can tell us about the influence of attitudes
on decisions, rather than simply about the influence of decisions on issues.
Peter Russell is a political scientist; one might therefore expect him
to be more at home with quantitative analysis than a lawyer such as Peck
or Weler. In fact, the quantifying techniques he has used in analysis of
Supreme Court of Canada cases39 are somewhat cruder than those employed
31 Id. at note 9.
32 Id. at 291.
33 Id.
84 Supra note 28, 49 Can. Bar Rev.
35 Supra note 28, 21 U. of Toronto L.
36 Id. at 150 at 326.
a7Id. at 326.
3 8 Supra note 28, 9 O.H.LJ. 1.
39 Supra note 2.
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in other Canadian studies. 40 This crudeness may simply be symptomatic of
an uncertainty and lack of interest on Russell's part in the precise signifi-
cance and use of quantitative methods as applied to appellate tribunals. Peck
considers the value of such methods to be that they demonstrate the impact
of appellate decisions on specific issues; Weiler suggests, albeit hesitantly
and with qualification, that these methods tell us something about judicial
attitude. Russell displays little concern with this crucial question. On bal-
ance, he appears to favour Peck's position. He is not prepared to draw cate-
gorical conclusions from his data about judges' attitudes: he writes that "it
requires only the barest understanding of the judicial process to appreciate
the fact that statistics which, as ours do, refer only to the bare outcome of
a decision, ignore the complex processes of reasoning which supports judicial
decisions .... Also, it requires only the barest understanding of the logic of
induction to realize that the discovery of a co-relation does not prove causa-
tion."41 Having made this denial, Russell then casts about for justification of
the process which takes up sixty-three pages, almost a quarter, of his study
of the Supreme Court. He writes:
While we are willing to acknowledge the limitations of quantitative studies
of judicial phenomena ... we are equally anxious to insist that such studies do
have some value. We can only appreciate their value by recognizing the questions
to which they are addressed. ... we are convinced that by acquiring a firmer
empirical basis for the answers we are inclined to give to these questions, our
understanding of some of the issues ... will be enhanced.42
This statement, although very vague, and hardly enough to support an
analysis over fifty pages long, does suggest that Russell's main claim is that
his brand of quantitative analysis illustrates the impact of votes on issues.
And yet examination of the issues dealt with by Russell reveals that few
of them are really substantive. Most of the questions to which Russell seeks
answers with a "firmer empirical basis" deal with the internal workings of
the Court. They include such matters as: What is the nature of the Court's
work? How often is it concerned with provincial law or Civil Code cases?
Are there significant differences in its disposition of appeals from different
sources? Is there any evidence of cultural alliances of judges on different
issues?43 The answers to many of these questions tell us nothing of judges'
attitudes or the impact of judges' decisions. They simply verify details of the
Court's jurisdiction and day-to-day operations. Such verification is valuable
enough. But Russell's confusion as to his purpose and the scanty theoretical
underpinnings he provides for his quantifying techniques render his analysis
less helpful and less interesting than that of Peck and Weiler.
Canadian quantitative analysts of judicial decisions seem, then, to be
uncertain of their art. Russell is confused, Weiler ambivalent, and Peck
modest. The central point at issue is whether quantitative analysis is a means
of examining judicial attitudes, or of examining judicial impact on issues. All
40 Russell himself would probably be the first to admit this crudity. See the quota-
tion, supra note 2.
41 Id. at 113.
42 Id. at 113-114.
43 Id. at 114.
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comment must be seen in this context. Elsewhere I have attempted to criti-
cize the fundamental assumptions, methodology and internal logic of scalb-
gram analysis.4 Of the fundamental assumptions, I wrote that behavioura-
lists are wrong in discounting the law as a key element in judicial decision,
since much of a judge's attitude is a "legal attitude," and since, in any event,
whatever it is that stimulates judicial response, it is the rules and principles
of law that define the acceptable limits of that response4 5 I criticized the
methodology, because I perceived it as requiring imposition by the researcher
of his attitude on the judiciary when postulating the question or defining the
issue raised by a given case.46 And I pointed out, in these terms, what I
considered an internal illogicality:
The method can be represented by the following three propositions: (1) if
responses are consistent, they are scalable; (2) if responses are scalable, they
are unidimensional; (3) if responses are unidimensional, they are scalable mean-
ingfully. The result of these three propositions is that if responses are either
consistent or scalable (and we have already noted that these terms appear to
by synonymous), then those responses are scalable meaningfully.4 7
The result of the three propositions seemed to me presumptuous if not illo-
gical, because that result presumed precisely what scalogram analysis sets
out to prove.
Professor Peck has convinced me that my criticisms of fundamental
assumptions and methodology are invalid when scalogram analysis is pre-
sented as a form of "impact" analysis. This is simply because impact analysis
purports to say nothing about judicial attitudes, or, at least, nothing of a
categorical and definitive kind. I have referred already in this article to this
point. Furthermore, Peck has pointed out to me that he early recognized the
internal difficulty to which I have just referred.48 Peck's writings suggest that
it is precisely this difficulty which led him to reject scalogram analysis as a
means of investigating judicial attitude. It should be observed that those who
apparently have not joined Peck in this rejection (eg, Weiler and Russell)
are still vulnerable to the criticisms I sketch above.
What is the attractiveness of these new behavioural and quantitative
methods? Why are they competing with, if not supplanting, traditional sub-
stantive analysis of appellate judgments? I earlier mentioned "a variety of
forces ... building in strength over a number of years"49 which lately have
coalesced. One such force is the thought of legal realists, which discounts
formal legal reasons for judgment, and emphasizes the character and perso-
nality of the judge, together with his intuitive formulation of decisions which
4 4 Slayton, supra note 23.
45 Id. at 399. At 400-401 I noted that judicial attitude may be very important when
the judge decides what is the law which limits his freedom of action (when the judge
decides what is Harts secondary rule or Kelsen's grundnorm).
46 Id. at 397.
47 Id. at 396-7.
48 See Peck, supra note 2, 45 Can. Bar Rev. 666 at 673, and S O-.LJ. 6 at 19-21.
49 See text, supra, at p. 429.
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only following formulation are justified and rationalized in legal terms.50
Another influence has been the growing use of quantitative methods in the
fields of psychology and,\,particularly, political science; the imitative faculty
is as strong among academic lawyers as it is elsewhere. Finally, one should
not underestimate the power of simple boredom; many years of "the same"
will inevitably lead those with intellectual curiosity along the paths of experi-
mentation.
I have tried to suggest both limitations in the utility of scalogram ana-
lysis, and a degree of confusion in Canada surrounding application of such
methods. If we harbour suspicions concerning the usefulness of specific
quantitative approaches to the study of law, must we simply revert to the old
ways? It is clear that we need not; the range of methods with which Canadian
legal academics can and should grapple is enormous. Putting behaviouralism
aside, we encounter, for example, what is referred to as the "political pro-
cess" approach. Just as sociology and anthropology give rise to legal sociology
and legal anthropology, so political science has generated a method which
assumes "that judges are policy-makers, just like Presidents and congressmen
and many administrators. Therefore, the appropriate subject to be studied in
investigating the decision-making of courts is not law but the politics of the
judiciary."51 Yet another approach to judicial decisions is what has been
termed "impact analysis." Professor Arthur S. Miller has identified two facets
of impact analysis: "(a) an appreciation by judges of the consequences of
their decisions; and (b) an evaluation by commentators of the social effects
of judicial decisions.152 Miller writes that impact analysis "looks to the con-
sequences of judicial decisions and evaluates them in accordance with the
extent to which they further the attainment of societal goals." s53 (It might be
noted here that Peck probably belongs in the impact analysis camp, and is
not a genuine behaviouralist.) 54 Lastly, we might mention "experimental
jurisprudence," which is described as "a science of law based on a rigorous
application of the scientific method to the study of the phenomena of law-
making, the effect of law upon society and the efficiency of laws in accom-
plishing the purposes for which they came into existence." 55 Experimental
jurisprudence, although much like impact analysis, goes further in that it
attempts to formulate a hypothesis ("jural law") that "describes or predicts
results which would occur on application of a similar regulatory law to similar
problems. 5 6
These various research theories and methods cannot replace traditional
analysis, for as their very proponents admit, they are directed, not towards
law as such, but towards political science, or sociology, or anthropology.
These theories and methods can, however, help us place traditional analysis
in context. Furthermore they represent a frontier of contemporary legal
research. It would be appropriate for Canadians to develop that frontier, as
they have developed others.
5 0Frank's Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Brentano's, 1930) is represen-
tative of this line of thought Professor Peck has suggested to me that although the
approach of judicial behaviouralists is broadly similar to that of American legal realists,
the real source of judicial behaviouralism is to be found in American political science.
[VOL. 10, No. 2
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Professor Peck calls legal realists the predecessors, but not the intellectual forebears,
of the judicial behaviouralists.
51 Schubert, supra note 22, Judicial Policy-Making 162.
52 Miller, On the Need for 'Impact Analysis' of Supreme Court Decisions (1965),
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